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Abstract In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining
problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point mono-
tonicity. While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong
d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson (J Econ Theory, 42:
50–58, 1987), this paper introduces local strong d-monotonicity and derives a neces-
sary and sufﬁcient condition for the Nash solution to be locally strongly d-monotonic.
This characterization is given by using the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining
solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d. Moverover, we present a sufﬁcient condition
for the Nash solution to be strong d-monotonic.
Keywords Nash bargaining solution · d-monotonicity · Diagonally dominant
Stieltjes matrix
1 Introduction
In this note we introduce the notion of local strong d-monotonicity for solutions
of bargaining problems. Thomson introduced and discussed in (Thomson 1987)t h e
disagreement point monotononicity property (d-monotonicity) for solutions of bar-
gaining problems. This property states that, if some agent increases his disagreement
point (also called threat-point) while the threat-point of the other players remains
J. C. Engwerda (B )
Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: j.c.engwerda@uvt.nl
R. C. Douven
CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, P.O. Box 80510,
2508 GM The Hague, The Netherlands
123J. C. Engwerda, R. C. Douven
constant then this agent’s payoff increases (or at least not decreases). He also con-
sidered strong d-monotonicity, which states that not only this agent’s payoff does not
decrease but also the payoffs of the other agents should not increase. Thomson shows
by means of a counterexample that the Nash solution does not satisfy this notion of
strong d-monotonicity.
This notion of d-monotonicity is a global property in the sense that this property
should hold for every positive increment of the threat-point at every threat-point d.
We will consider here the local version of this property. That is, we are interested
in the effect of changes on the point of agreement for a ﬁxed feasible set if one (arbi-
trarilychosen)playerunilaterallychangeshisdisagreementpointbyasmall(positive)
amount. If this player is the only one who gains and this property holds irrespective of
which player alters his threat-point, d, we call the bargaining solution locally strongly
d-monotonic at d.
Given some threat-point and the corresponding bargaining point, this notion tells
ussomethingaboutthestabilityoftherealizedbargainingpoint.This,inthefollowing
sense. Assume that the threat-point can be controlled to some extent by an exogenous
authority(e.g.,aEuropeancommissionwhomightconsidertochangesomedirectives
which might favor some outside options of participating countries). If the bargaining
point is locally strongly d-monotonic at d, then whenever this threat-point is changed
at one entry only, this action will be disapproved by all other players. This, in contrast
to the case that such a change in the threat-point is favourable for some other player(s)
too. In that case, it is rational for that (those) other player(s), at least, to not be against
such a change. So, fewer players will be against a reopening of bargaining in such a
case.Inthissense,thethresholdtoreopentheprocesswillbelower,andthebargaining
point might be called less stable.
So, this notion of local strong d-monotonicity can be viewed as a new independent
axiom for a bargaining solution which implies stability. We give in Sect. 3 below a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition of domain restriction over which the Nash solu-
tion has the property of local strong d-monotonicity. Furthermore, we present in this
section a sufﬁcient condition for strong d-monotonicity.
Section 2 introduces some notation and preliminary results, whereas Sect. 4 con-
siders some examples. Finally Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Following Thomson and Lensberg (1989),a nn-person bargaining problem is a pair
(S,d), where S ⊂ Rn is called the feasible set, Rn the utility space and d the dis-
agreement point.
Thomson considers two classes of bargaining problems: (1)  
n, where the feasible
set S is convex, compact and such that there exists a x ∈ S with x > d ( h e r ew eu s e
the vector inequality notation); and (2)  n, which is a subclass of  
n, the so-called
classofcomprehensivebargainingproblems.Thissubclassisobtainedbyconsidering
just those elements in S satisfying the additional property that whenever x ∈ S and
d < x ≤ x, then x ∈ S.
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We will consider in this paper a subclass  n
P of  n. We assume that the (ﬁxed)
feasible set satisﬁes the additional requirement that the set P of (weak) Pareto opti-
mal solutions can be described by a smooth strictly concave function ϕ, that is
 n
P ={ (x1,...,xn)T ∈  n | xi ≥ di,xn ≤ ϕ(x1,...,xn−1), and whenever x ∈
 n
P and d ≤ y ≤ x, then y ∈  n
P}.H e r evT denotes the transpose of a vector/matrix
v. This class of problems (for larger classes of bargaining problems, see e.g., Peters
1992 or Thomson and Lensberg 1989) is particularly relevant to applied economics
(see e.g., the literature on policy coordination Petit 1990; de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg
1991;GhoshandMasson1994;DouvenandEngwerda1995;PlasmansandEngwerda
2006).
Given this class of n-person problems, a solution is a function F associating with
every (S,d) in this class the point of agreement F(S,d) ∈ S. Since we consider here
a ﬁxed feasible set, the dependence of F on S will be omitted. F is called the Nash
solution, N, if for every ﬁxed pair (S,d), F(S,d) is assigned the point where the
product  (xi − di) is maximized for x ∈ S with x ≥ d.
Fornotationalconveniencen denotestheset{1,...,n}.Furthermore, I istheiden-
tity matrix, ei the ith standard basis vector in Rn, e the vector (1,...,1)T and 0
¯
the
zero vector (0,...,0)T. The dimension of these vectors will be clear from the con-
text. Furthermore, diag(ai) denotes a diagonal matrix with as its ith diagonal entry
ai; (A|B) the extended matrix of A and B; and sgn(a) the sign of the number a.I f
x := (x1,...,xn) is a vector, x− is the truncated vector (x1,...,xn−1). ϕ
 
i denotes
the ith partial derivative of ϕ.
The property of local strong d-monotonicity with respect to the disagreement point
d is now formalized as follows:
Definition 1 Abargainingsolution F on n
P iscalledlocallystronglyd-monotonicat
aproblem(S,d) ∈  n





In the ensueing analysis the set of so-called M-matrices arise in a natural way. An
M-matrixisann×n matrixwithnonpositiveoff-diagonalentrieswhoseinverseexists
and is entry-wise nonnegative. Symmetric M-matrices are called Stieltjes matrices.
From Berman and Plemmons (1994, pp. 141), we recall the following result.
Lemma 1 (1) Symmetric M-matrices are positive definite.
(2) Symmetric positive definite matrices with nonpositive off-diagonal entries are
M-matrices.
Unfortunately, the inverse of a nonsingular nonnegative matrix is not in general an
M-matrix. In literature the problem has been addressed to characterize all matrices
thathavethisproperty.Thisturnsouttobeadifﬁcultproblem.Aclassofmatricesthat
satisfy this property are e.g., the so-called strictly ultrametric matrices (see Nabben
and Varga 1994, Nabben 2000).
Finally, we call a symmetric square matrix A = (aij) diagonally dominant if
|aii|≥
 
j =i |aij|, for all i.
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3 Theoretical results
By assumption, the Nash bargaining solution xN := (xN
1 ,...,xN
n ) is the argument
that solves the maximization problem
max
x−
f (x−) := max
x−
 i∈n−1(xi − di)(ϕ(x−) − dn),
where ϕ 
i < 0 and ϕ
  
is negative definite.
This maximization problem has, according to Nash (1950), exactly one solution.
Obviously, this solution lies not on the edge of the Pareto frontier P of S, i.e., it is
an interior point of P. Thus, the ﬁrst order conditions yield that the Nash bargaining
solution is uniquely determined by:
gi(xN
−,d) = 0, ∀i ∈ n − 1, (1)
where gi(x−,d) := ϕ(x−) − dn + (xi − di)ϕ 
i(x−), i ∈ n − 1.
Note that all derivatives in these n−1 equations are evaluated at the Nash solution.
To simplify notation we will drop this argument whenever it is the Nash solution. So,
unless stated differently, we assume from now on that the argument in the derivatives
will always be the Nash solution.
Remark 1 Recall from the two-player case that the Nash solution can geometrically
also be characterized as that point xN on the curve ϕ such that the line tangent to ϕ at
xN intersects the d1-axis at the point d1 + 2(xN
1 − d1). For the multi-player case this
generalizes as follows. Consider the plane tangent to the graph of ϕ at x, i.e.,
yn(y−) = ϕ(x−) + ϕ (x−)(y− − x−). (2)
Then xN is the point such that this plane intersects the vertical plane through the Nash






n−1), i ∈ n − 1. Substitution of this into (2) yields the equa-
tions (1).
Since the solution of the above optimization problem is a maximum location, the
secondorderderivative H of f evaluatedattheNashsolutionissemi-negativedefinite.




where the ith entry, dii, of the diagonal matrix D is  j =i∈n−1(xN

































We assume throughout this note additionally that H is invertible. In particular, it fol-




= H−1D. According to the



















i) | e). (5)
To complete the picture of
∂xN
i
∂dj , we still have to consider
∂xN
n
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Theorem 1 If the hamiltonian of the Pareto frontier evaluated at the Nash solution is
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i) | e). (7)
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i − di) = ϕ
 
j(xN
j − dj) =− (ϕ − dn). (8)

































































































From this, using (8) and the above introduced notation, (6) is obtained.    



































immediately from (9) that all diagonal entries of the sensitivity matrix are positive. Or
stated differently,
Corollary 1 The Nash solution is d-monotonic.
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Next, we address the question under which conditions on ϕ the Nash solution is
locally strongly d-monotonic. We have the following result:
Theorem 2 The Nash solution is locally strongly d-monotonic if and only if −Gi sa
diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix.
Proof Consider (9). Since vN
i > 0, it follows that sgn((∂xN
∂d )ij) = sgn(−Gij), i, j ∈
n − 1. As already noted, −G is positive definite. So, by Lemma 1.2, −G is a Stielt-
jes matrix. Moreover it follows from (9) that sgn((∂xN








∂d )in ≤ 0 if and only if entry i of Ge ≤ 0, for all i ∈ n − 1. Or, stated differently,
−G is diagonally dominant.    













−,d) is nonpositive. Furthermore, as already noticed, −G is posi-
tive definite. Therefore, an equivalent statement of Theorem 2 is: the Nash solu-
tion is locally strongly d-monotonic if and only if g
 
x−(xN










is a diagonally dominant matrix with nonpositive off-
diagonal entries.





−,d) is nonpositive if, e.g., ϕ
  
is a nonpositive matrix.
















is nonnegative. Or, equivalently, ϕ Tϕ  − (ϕ − dn)ϕ
  
is a nonnegative matrix.
(3) In the two-player case, the Nash solution is always strongly d-monotonic.














is a diagonally dom-
inant matrix. This follows directly from Remark 2.1 by a simple spelling of −G.





is “almost” zero. In that case −G approximately equals (eeT + I)−1 which
is a diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix. Since this is the case independent of
the choice of the threat-point, under these conditions the Nash solution will be
strongly d-monotonic.
Next we derive a sufﬁcient condition on the Pareto frontier under which the Nash
solution is (globally) strongly d-monotonic. Inspired by items (1) and (2) of the above
remark we consider the case when ϕ
  
is a nonpositive matrix. The result is stated in
Theorem 3. Its proof uses the next lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume S is an invertible matrix and D is a positive diagonal matrix.
Consider P := (S + D)−1.
(1) If S−1 is diagonally dominant, then P is diagonally dominant.
(2) If S−1 is a Stieltjes matrix, then P is a Stieltjes matrix.
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Proof (1) First notice that








Due to our assumptions, it is easily veriﬁed that H is diagonally dominant. From
e.g., Lei et al. (2003) (see alsoCarlson and Markham 1979) we conclude then that
the Schur complement of H, which equals (10), is also diagonally dominant.
(2) Since by assumption, S−1 is a Stieltjes matrix, by Lemma 1.1, S−1 is a positive
definite matrix. From this it is obvious that P is positive definite too. So, the
diagonal entries of P are positive.
Furthermore since, by assumption, S and D are both nonnegative matrices, so is
S+D.Nextweconsidertheoff-diagonalentriesof P.Sinceboth D−1 and S−1 are
Stieltjesmatrices,sois D−1+S−1.So,inparticular,allentriesof(D−1+S−1)−1
are nonnegative. From (10) it is obvious then that all off-diagonal entries of P are
nonpositive.Sincewealreadyarguedabovethat P ispositivedefinite,Lemma1.2
shows that P is a Stieltjes matrix.    
Theorem 3 Assume that at any point of the Pareto frontier



















is a diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix. Then, the Nash solution is strongly
d-monotonic.
Proof What has to be shown is that irrespective of the choice of the threat-point d the
Nash solution is locally strongly d-monotonic or, equivalently (see Theorem 2), that
−G is a diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix.
To that end ﬁrst note that, since  −1 is a diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix, so
is (ϕ − dn) −1. Therefore, by Lemma 2,s oi s










= P−Pe(eT Pe+1)−1eT P.
Since P is diagonally dominant, Pe ≥ 0. Consequently, Pe(eT Pe+ 1)−1eT P ≥ 0.
So, all off-diagonal entries of −G are nonpositive. Obviously, −G is positive definite
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and all entries of −G−1 are nonnegative. So, by Lemma 1.2, −G is a Stieltjes matrix.
Furthermore it follows from (13) that
−Ge =
 






1 + eT Pe
 
Pe ≥ 0.
That is, −G is diagonally dominant.    
Remark 3 (1) Clearly, (11) is only satisﬁed if ϕ
  
is nonpositive. Furthermore, it is




, whereas for the multivariable
case, with S := diag(ϕ
 













under which a bargaining solution satisﬁes strong d-monotonicity.
(2) Consider the next statements:
(i)  −1 is a diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix.
(ii) (eeT + (ϕ − dn) )−1 is a diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix.
(iii) −G is a diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix.
Then, (i) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (iii). The ﬁrst implication can be shown by using the fact
that (eeT +  )−1 = 1




whereas the second implication follows using similar arguments as in the proof
of Theorem 3. Unfortunately none of the reverse implications holds.
(3) In particular it follows from (11), using (1), that the Nash solution is locally





i − di)]−1 is a diago-
nally dominant Stieltjes matrix.
Remark 4 The above analysis can also be used to study the weighted Nash solutions.
That is the argument that solves the maximization problem
max
x−
˜ f (x−) := max
x−
 i∈n−1(xi − di)αi(ϕ(x−) − dn)αn,
where the positive weights αi reﬂect the agent’s bargaining powers.
Introducing the weight matrix Wk ∈ Rk×k as Wk := diag(αn
αi ) we have that with
˜ G :=
 









































Using this it follows then that the results of Corollary 1 and Theorems 2 and 3 apply
for this case as well, with G replaced by ˜ G.
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4 Examples
In this section we provide two examples. The ﬁrst example provides a number of
Pareto frontiers for which the Nash solution is strongly d-monotonic. Intuitively it
demonstrates that if the frontier “does not bend too much” one may expect that this
property holds.
The second example may be interpreted as a cartel-formation game. For different
sets of parameters we present numerically the set of threat-points where the Nash
solution is locally strongly d-monotonic.
Example 1 (1) Assume that ϕ
  
is a nonpositive diagonal matrix (so, ϕ(x−) is e.g., a
plane or ϕ(x−) = r + bTx− + 1
2xT
−Ax−, where b,x− are (n − 1)-dimensional
vectors with b ≤ 0 and d ≥ 0 and A a nonpositive diagonal matrix). Then,
for every choice of d, −G is a diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix. So, see
Theorem 2, the Nash solution is strongly d-monotonic.
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is strongly d-monotonic. It is easily veriﬁed that this result also holds if ϕ(x−)




n−1,α i > 0.
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(3) Assume that the Pareto frontier is described by ϕ(x−) =  n−1
i=1(bi −xi)αi, where
0 <α i < 1 and xi ≤ bi, i ∈ n − 1. Note that this type of functions includes










(bi − xi)(bj − x j)




(bi − xi)2 ϕ.









































where D := diag(ϕ +
ϕ−dn
αi ). From (13) it is easily veriﬁed that −G is a Stielt-
jes matrix. Furthermore −Ge = (1 − eT D−1e
eT D−1e+ 1
dn
)D−1e. Clearly this vector is
positive, so −G is diagonally dominant too. Since, for all d, −G is a diago-
nally dominant Stieltjes matrix, we conclude that the Nash solution is strongly
d-monotonic.
Example 2 Consider three ﬁrms who sell an amount xi of a product on a market. The
price, p, they get on the market depends on the quantity sold by all ﬁrms. That is,
p = c − α1x1 − α2x2 − α3x3, where αi and c are some positive constants. The costs
for producing xi are Ci(xi). So the profits for ﬁrm i are πi = pxi − Ci(xi).N e x t







λi = 1 and λi ≥ 0.
By maximizing π for all possible parameter combinations, λ := (λ1,λ 2,λ 3), one
obtains the Pareto frontier characterizing all possible joint maximal profits the ﬁrms
can obtain by cooperation.
For simplicity we will assume in this example that the threat-point is given exog-
enously. This assumption might make sense, e.g., in a situation where the ﬁrms are
divisions of a parent company.
We will consider two different speciﬁcations for the cost functions Ci.
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Fig. 1 Case α1 = 1, βi = 1,
c = 5, d = 0. Dot=locally
strongly d-monotonic







Case 1 Ci(xi) = βxi.
Inthiscasestraightforward(thoughlengthy)calculationsshowthattheParetofrontier
is given by the plane:






So, foralld, theNashsolution isstrongly d-monotonic inthiscase(seeExample 1.1).




d-monotonicity of the Nash solution. Differentiation of π w.r.t. xi yields 3 ﬁrst order
conditions in xi for every λ (in this case, this is just a set of linear equations). From
this, one can solve xi in terms of λ. Then, one can determine for an arbitrary threat-
point the corresponding Nash solution, with e.g., the numerical algorithm outlined in
Douven (1995, Sect. 3.3.2), (see also Engwerda 2005, Sect. 6.4).
From the seven equations πi − pxi − Ci(xi) = 0, ∂π
∂xi = 0, i = 1,2,3 and
 3
i=1 λi = 1, one can then implicitly solve (π3,x1,x2,x3,λ 1,λ 2,λ 3) as a function
of π1 and π2. In particular the implicit function theorem can be used to ﬁnd analytic
expressionsforthederivativeandhamiltonianofπ3 = ϕ(π1,π 2)attheNashsolution.
From this, the monotonicity property can straightforwardly be veriﬁed.
Figures 1, 2, 3 present some results for this example for different parameters and
threat-points. In all these cases, the parameters α1 = 1, βi = 1 and c = 5 remained
unchanged.
Figure 1 reports the local strong d-monotonicity property of the Nash solution, if
the threat-point d = 0, for different values of the parameters α2 and α3 (both ranging
between 0.1 and 0.5). A dot (empty space) indicates that with that choice of param-
eters, the zero-threat-point is (not) locally strongly d-monotonic. Not shown here is
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Fig. 2 Case α1 = 1,
α2 = α3 = 1
4, βi = 1, c = 5































Fig. 3 Case α1 = 1, α2 = α3 = 1
4, βi = 1, c = 5
that for large values of these parameters the zero-threat-point is also locally strongly
d-monotonic. So the case of two ﬁrms having a small impact on the price compared
to the third ﬁrm seems to not be stable (in the sense discussed in the introduction).
Here the notion “small” should however be interpreted in the light of the other model
parametersthatwerekeptconstant.Someadditionalexperimentssuggestthatthelevel
of the βi parameters are more important than that of the c parameter for this com-
parison. If all ﬁrms have a substantial effect on the price, the Nash solution is locally
strongly d-monotonic.
Figure 2 reports local strong d-monotonicity for different threat-points in case
α2 = α3 = 1
4. The threat-point d1 ranges here from 0 to 1.9 and d2 = d3 ranges
from 0 to 3.1. To complete the three dimensional picture we plotted in Fig. 3 for three
different values of d1 (0, 0.5 and 0.7, respectively) using the same model parameters
the monotonicity result if the other two coordinates of the threat-point d2 and d3 range
between 0 and 3.1. Notice that the closer the threat-point is to the Pareto frontier, the
more this frontier resembles a plane. For that reason in fact the dots in the right and
upper part of these graphs extend until the Pareto frontier. For numerical simplicity
we did not plot this extension.
Concluding, this example demonstrates that if ﬁrms have a substantial effect on
the price, the Nash solution is strong d-monotonic. If at least one ﬁrm has a “small”
(see above discussion) impact on the price, there exist areas of threat-points where the
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Nash solution is not locally strongly d-monotonic. Furthermore we observe that if at
a certain threat-point the Nash solution is locally strongly d-monotonic this does not
imply that at every larger threat-point the Nash solution has this property too.
5 Concluding remarks
In this note we derived, under some technical conditions, the sensitivity matrix of the
Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d. In particular, this makes it
possible to analyze the local strong d-monotonicity of the Nash solution. We showed
that the Nash solution satisﬁes this property if and only if a certain matrix, −G, eval-
uated at the Nash bargaining solution is a diagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix. Using
this result, a class of bargaining problems was characterized for which the Nash solu-
tion is strongly d-monotonic. The results were illustrated in a number of examples.
The condition under which the Nash solution is locally strongly d-monotonic is
phrased in terms of the (second) order derivative of the Pareto frontier. Unfortunately
at this moment a clear intuition about the set of problems for which the Nash solution
is (locally) strongly d-monotonic is lacking. From the condition it is clear that if the
Pareto frontier has no extreme bendings, the property holds. This implies that if in the
bargaining problem, the interests of the players are similar the Nash solution is locally
strongly d-monotonic. Finding a geometric interpretation of the conditions and, from
that, more intuition about the set of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution
satisﬁes the monotonicity property remains, however, an open problem.
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